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a philosophical point of view, it does not offer much, especially in terms 
of the problems relevant for philosophy of religion. But again, this might 
be too much to expect from a popular book such as BB. Fortunately, there 
is an emerging literature on philosophers engaging with psychological 
and biological explanations of religion (e.g., The Believing Primate, OUP 
2009). Further, Barrett himself has addressed the topic in several articles 
and his other 2012 book Cognitive Science, Religion and Theology: From 
Human Minds to Divine Minds (JTF Press), which I  would suggest as 
a companion piece to BB.
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In his excellent book Dialogues about God, Charles Taliaferro gives 
a comprehensive introduction into the main questions concerning the 
subject of God. The theist Taliaferro presents his introduction in the form 
of a dialogue, because he appreciates the abilities of self-questioning and 
of placing oneself into the opposing position (p. xii). He chose the form 
of a friendly dialogue in order to enable a constructive discussion and 
reduce the hostility which sometimes occurs in philosophical discussions 
(pp. xiii-xiv). The four characters of this dialogue are the secular naturalist 
Pat, the theist Chris, the agnostic Tony and the negative theologian Liz 
who holds that God is beyond human concepts (pp. xiv-xvi).
Is Theism coherent and valid as an Explanation?: Pat begins the dialogue 
by arguing that theism is incoherent. Theism assumes the existence of 
God, a conscious immaterial person. But we are only familiar with bodily 
beings. Without a face there can be no grin. Without a body there can 
be no thinking, feeling and acting. The idea of an immaterial person is 
incoherent (pp. 2-4). Chris objects to that and argues that human beings 
are conscious immaterial persons. Hence conscious immaterial persons 
are possible. Chris argues that materialism with respect to human beings 
is false. Beliefs, purposes and desires cannot be reduced to physical 
processes in the brain. We can imagine that human beings are zombies, 
i.e. that they behave as if they had mental life with conscious experiences 
while in fact lacking mental life altogether. This conceivability is 
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evidence for the assumption that zombies are possible. If zombies are 
possible, then my body has the property of possibly existing without my 
consciousness, whereas my consciousness does not have this property. 
Thus, by Leibniz’s Law of the Indiscernability of Identical Entities my 
body and my consciousness are different entities, because they differ in 
at least one property. We know that there are many correlations between 
our bodily states and our mental states. However, correlations are not 
the same as identity relations (pp. 4-5). Pat responds to this by arguing 
that the constant correlations between our bodily states and our mental 
states are evidence of the identity of bodily and mental states (p.  5). 
Chris admits that in the case of water and H2O the constant correlation 
of the two is evidence of the identity of the two, because we can grasp the 
identity by thinking that water is composed of H2O. By contrast, we will 
never observe subjective conscious experience. We can only discover it 
introspectively. Therefore we know that our conscious experiences are 
radically distinct from our brain states (p. 7). Chris further argues that 
even if ‘human consciousness is necessarily physical, it does not follow 
that every form of consciousness is necessarily physical’ (p. 8). Even if 
materialism with respect to human beings were true, it would not follow 
that conscious immaterial persons are impossible.
Then Pat and Chris discuss whether theism is a valid explanation of 
the cosmos. Chris argues that the natural sciences explain the existence 
and the properties of many contingent objects in the cosmos. But we 
also need an explanation for why there is a cosmos at all and why there is 
this cosmos rather than another cosmos. For if every part of the cosmos 
is contingent then the cosmos itself is contingent (p.  13). Theism is 
an explanation of our cosmos. The existence of the cosmos is explained 
as created according to God’s contingent will. God himself does not 
have to be explained, because he exists necessarily (p. 14). Pat’s stance 
is that the necessary truths (including mathematical truths) are features 
of language and that we could simply define the cosmos as existing 
necessarily (p. 15).
Eventually Liz presents her view that God is not a thing among other 
things. He is beyond all human concepts and categories. Unlike Pat, Liz 
does not deny God’s existence. Liz only denies that God can be described 
(p. 19). Chris responds that the negations Liz proposes only make sense 
if there is some positive concept of God (p. 21).
The Concept of God: The divine attributes are discussed in the second 
conversation. God is omniscient and has immediate awareness of all 
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states of affairs (p. 27). Pat argues that God’s omniscience is incompatible 
with human libertarian freedom by presenting the following dilemma. 
Either God is omniscient or not. If he is, then he knows your future 
actions. That you will go sailing tomorrow is fixed now, because God 
foreknows it. Hence you do not have the ability to do otherwise than 
going sailing tomorrow. You lack freedom in the libertarian sense. If 
God is omniscient, then human beings do not have libertarian freedom. 
Hence, either human beings do not have libertarian freedom or God 
is not omniscient (p.  29). Chris’s response is that being omniscient 
means to know all truths that are possible to know. Today there is not 
yet a matter of fact about what you will do tomorrow. Hence it cannot 
be known and is not required to be known in order to be omniscient 
(p. 30). This stance seems problematic for the theist, however. For there 
are many prophecies in the Bible foretelling future events. For example, 
Jesus foretold Peter’s denial and the prophets of the Old Testament 
foretold Jesus’ life, suffering and death. There seems to be better solution 
for the theist, namely Molinism. Luis de Molina assumed that before the 
creation of the world God knew about every possible creature what she/
he/it would do if put in certain circumstances. God chose to create this 
cosmos on the basis of this Middle Knowledge. God’s foreknowledge 
of what the creatures in this cosmos will do does not determine their 
actions, because it has no causal influence on the creatures. Rather, God’s 
foreknowledge is dependent on what human beings will freely choose to 
do. (See Thomas Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 36-46.)
Pat takes the discussion to the divine attributes of omnipotence and 
essential goodness. She argues that these attributes are incompatible. For 
if God is essentially good then because of his nature God cannot do any 
evil. But Pat can do evil and thus is more powerful than God (at least in 
this respect). Hence God is not omnipotent (p. 36). Chris responds that 
the ability to do evil is not a power, but a deficiency (p. 37).
Arguments for the Existence of God: In the third conversation Chris 
advances four arguments in favour of theism. First, Chris presents the 
ontological argument. If God exists, then he exists necessarily. Essential 
or necessary existence is one of the qualities of a  perfect being. God 
cannot exist contingently. Therefore either he exists necessarily or his 
existence is impossible. The existence of God is possible. We have reason 
to think so, because there is no contradiction in the concept of God. 
This is so for two reasons. First, this is so, because we can positively 
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conceive that God exists. Second, this is so, because the complexity of 
the universe, the existence of human consciousness and the existence of 
religious experience are evidence in favour of God’s existence and thus 
also in favour of the assumption that it is possible that God exists. Hence 
the existence of God is not impossible. Thus God exists necessarily 
(pp.  52-53). Pat objects that Chris simply defines God into existence. 
Existence and necessary existence are not proper qualities of a concept. 
For they do nothing to enlarge the concept (p.  54). In Chris’s view, 
however, necessary existence is a proper quality of a concept, because it 
is an excellence which contingent beings lack (p. 54).
Second, Chris presents the cosmological argument. Pick any physical 
object in our cosmos you like. Let us assume we seek an  account for 
the existence of this physical object. It exists but it could also not have 
existed. It exists contingently. It does not explain its own existence. It has 
been caused by another physical object which again exists contingently. 
This physical object again exists contingently as well as its cause, etc. We 
can go back as far as we wish in this kind of causal chains of contingently 
existing objects. But we never get an ultimate explanation of the existence 
of any of these contingently existing objects. There are only contingent 
objects in the cosmos and the cosmos as a  whole exists contingently. 
Only God as necessary being provides an  ultimate explanation of the 
existence of the cosmos and every object in it (pp. 56-57). In response 
to this Pat keeps her view to regard the cosmos as the ultimate frame 
of explanation. She is not willing to go beyond physical explanations to 
explain the cosmos (p. 62).
Third, Chris presents the teleological argument. The cosmos has a high 
degree of structure and order. This enables the existence of irreducibly 
complex organisms with consciousness. The existence of an  intelligent 
good God provides an  intentional explanation for this. It is likely that 
God wants there to be intelligent conscious creatures in the cosmos and 
thus designs to cosmos accordingly. By contrast, the naturalist has a hard 
time of explaining the structure, order and complexity of the cosmos, 
because only causal explanations are available for him (pp. 63-65). Pat 
objects that this argument is only plausible if we posit a finite amount of 
time. If there is an infinite period of time, then all possible configurations 
of the cosmos are expected to occur sometimes (p. 65).
Fourth, Chris presents the argument from religious experience. There 
is widespread testimony of the existence of a transcendent reality. This 
is evidence in favour of the existence of a transcendent reality. Pat raises 
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four objections and Chris responds to each of them. First, Pat argues 
that because of their diversity religious experiences cannot be evidence 
in favour of one and the same entity. Chris responds that the religious 
experiences of adherents of different religions share many elements. 
They have in common that God reveals himself as good, compassionate 
and powerful (p. 68). Second, Pat argues that the existence of religious 
experiences can be explained naturally without appeal to the existence 
of a transcendent reality. Religious experiences can be explained by the 
human desire for mercy, forgiveness, etc., and by the religious training 
the persons with religious experiences have received. Chris responds 
even if God uses natural means to perpetuate religious experiences it 
does not follow that religious experiences do not point to the existence 
of God (p. 70). Third, Pat argues that even if religious experiences are 
evidence in favour of a  transcendent reality they are not evidence in 
favour of the theistic God as a necessary, omniscient, omnipotent, and 
essentially good being over other transcendental realities. Chris agrees 
with this objection by Pat and admits that it is not by experience alone 
but only by reasoning and revelation by God that we come to know the 
divine attributes (p. 71). Fourth, Pat argues that religious experiences are 
not valid evidence, because we can produce them by pharmaceuticals. 
Chris responds that even if this is so it does not undermine religious 
experiences as evidence for the existence of God. God is omnipresent 
and religious experiences can be evidence of him even if we have the 
power to produce them (p. 72).
The Problem of Evil: Pat starts the fourth conversation by presenting 
the problem of evil. If God is all-good he wants to prevent evil. If God 
is all-powerful and all-knowing he can prevent evil. So why is there 
evil? (p. 77) Chris answers this question with the free-will defence. It is 
good that God creates creatures with free will. Free will entails that the 
creatures have the ability to do evil. God allows that in order to keep 
the value of free will for his creatures: ‘ ... deep moral freedom involves 
acting in favour of goodness when one could do otherwise.’ (p. 81)
The second challenge Pat raises is about the amount of evil. Why 
did God not create a world with less evil? Chris argues that there is no 
best possible world. This is analogous to there being no greatest possible 
number. One can always ask why there is not less evil and why there are 
not more values in the world (p. 80).
Miscellaneous Topics: In the fifth conversation miscellaneous topics 
about God are discussed. Miracles are events brought about by special 
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acts by God that violate at least one law of nature. Miracles like the 
resurrection of Jesus are radical breaks of the regularities of the world 
(p. 106). Pat distrusts testimonies of miracles in general, for she thinks 
it is more probable that the witnesses had hallucinations than that there 
was a radical break of a law of nature (pp. 107-108). Chris regards the 
special divine acts involved in miracles as similar to acts of human 
free will. Both types of actions are free and cannot be predicted by 
knowledge of the current state of the universe and the laws of nature. 
The type of miracle that occurs most often is religious experience in 
which God causes an  experiential awareness of the divine in human 
beings (p. 108). Chris’s view that miracles are possible can be backed up 
by Alvin Plantinga’s argumentation. First, miracles are not incompatible 
with classical Newtonian science, because the laws of classical mechanics 
hold only for closed systems. (See Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict 
Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), pp. 76-84.) Second, miracles are compatible with quantum 
mechanics for the same reason. Furthermore, some physicists think that 
miracles are not even breaks of the laws of quantum mechanics, because 
the wave function of quantum mechanics only gives us probabilities 
where each particle is located. On this view miracles are extremely 
improbable events caused by God. (See Alvin Plantinga, Where the 
Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and Naturalism, pp. 94-97.)
Eventually, the incarnation as an  issue within Christian theism is 
discussed. Jesus Christ is both God and a  man. The divine attributes 
are necessary existence, omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, 
essential goodness and eternal or everlasting existence. By contrast, the 
human attributes are contingent existence, finite knowledge, power and 
presence, not essential goodness and temporally finite existence. These 
properties are direct contraries. Pat argues that it is impossible for one 
person to exemplify both the divine and the human properties (p. 111). 
Chris responds by stating that the Christian doctrine is that Jesus Christ is 
both wholly God and a whole human being. But he is not the whole God 
and he is not a mere human being. Chris advocates Eastern Christology. 
There is one single divine nature. But God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
has three centres of consciousness. In the incarnation the Son kept all the 
divine attributes. But he undertook a radical self-limitation and limited 
himself to a human mind within his divine mind (p. 112). The Son of 
Good took on an individual human nature. In a proximate sense it was 
Christ’s human nature which did miracles and rose from the dead while 
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ultimately it was the Son of God who did miracles and rose from the dead. 
(See Thomas Flint, ‘“A Death He Freely Accepted”: Molinist Reflections 
on the Incarnation’, Faith and Philosophy, 18: 1 (2001), 5-6.) Here is how 
this account can be applied to the attribute of essential goodness. Jesus 
Christ as the Son of God was essentially good and not able to sin. But 
Jesus as a human being was not essentially good. He was able to sin and 
faced real temptation. By his Middle Knowledge of counterfactuals of 
creaturely freedom God foreknew that Jesus Christ as a  human being 
would resist all temptations if he was put it the circumstances he was 
put in. In this way God foreknew with certainty that Jesus would resist 
all temptations and freely choose to accept the death on the cross for the 
sake of the redemption of us sinners. (See Thomas Flint, ‘“A Death He 
Freely Accepted”: Molinist Reflections on the Incarnation’, pp. 7-10.)
Conclusion: Charles Taliaferro’s book Dialogues about God is 
an  excellent, comprehensive and easy-to-read introduction into the 
important topics about God. Taliaferro presents the different views with 
clarity and covers the most important aspects of the topic. It is a great 
introduction for undergraduate students and non-philosophers, and 
gives a  wonderful overview of the fascinating topic of God. It is not 
intended go into great depth and detail and it is not intended to advance 
the current discussions in philosophical theology.
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Fraser Watts (ed.). Creation: Law and Probability. Ashgate, 2008.
Creation: Law and Probability is a collection of papers drawn from, or 
prompted by, the second meeting of the International Society for Science 
and Religion held in Boston in 2004, and published within the Ashgate 
Science and Religion Series.
With a  keen interest in the relation between science and religion 
and particular interests in the nature of physical law (probabilistic or 
otherwise) and the nature of chance (physical or otherwise), I found this 
book interesting. It gave me valuable insight into how various religious 
perspectives understand the concepts of law and probability, and the role 
those concepts play within those perspectives. (Although it should be 
